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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 10-3770 
____________ 
 
GARY J. SHEEHAN, SR., 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DELAWARE & HUDSON RAILWAY COMPANY, INC., d/b/a CP Rail 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3-09-cv-00265) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 12, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  July 22, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Gary Sheehan appeals from the District Court’s order denying him a new trial.  He 
claims the District Court abused its discretion by granting a motion for reconsideration 
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filed by Delaware and Hudson Railway Company, Inc. (“D&H”), and by failing to 
postpone the trial.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm. 
I. 
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 After he was injured in a workplace slip and fall accident, Sheehan brought suit 
against D&H under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. for 
failure to maintain a safe work environment.  During discovery, Sheehan served D&H 
with a supplemental economic expert report, referencing earnings of a similarly situated 
employee, which nearly doubled his claimed economic losses.  D&H subsequently 
submitted an economic expert report from Chad Staller.  D&H requested a third 
continuance to depose the similarly situated employee whose earnings formed the basis 
of Sheehan’s supplemental report.  Sheehan opposed any further delay.  In response, 
D&H represented that it would not call Staller as a witness at trial.  The District Court 
granted D&H’s request for a continuance, and trial was to begin on May 19, 2010. 
On May 7, 2010, D&H added Staller as an expert witness, and Sheehan objected 
as discovery had already closed.  On May 14, 2010, D&H sent a letter to Sheehan, which 
included thirteen photographs that William Farley, a D&H yard manager, allegedly took 
on the day of the accident.  Sheehan filed motions in limine to exclude the photographs 
and Staller’s testimony on the grounds that they were not timely produced in violation of 
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.  The District Court granted the motions.  D&H filed 
a motion for reconsideration, and the District Court granted the request.  In response, 
Sheehan requested a deposition of Staller, but he ultimately did not depose him.  On 
May 24, 2010, the jury returned a verdict in favor of D&H.   Sheehan moved for a new 
trial on the grounds that the District Court improperly granted the motion for 
reconsideration.  The District Court denied Sheehan’s motion, and he filed a timely 
notice of appeal.
1
 
II. 
Sheehan claims the District Court erred in granting D&H’s motion for 
reconsideration to allow admission of the thirteen photographs and Staller’s testimony, 
and for failing to postpone the trial due to the late admission of evidence.  We review the 
District Court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.  Max’s 
Seafood Café ex. rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999). 
III. 
We first address Sheehan’s claim that the District Court erred in reversing its 
decision to exclude the photographs and Staller’s testimony.  When a party does not 
comply with its discovery obligations, several factors guide a district court’s 
discretionary determination of whether evidence should nonetheless be admitted:  (1) the 
prejudice or surprise to the opposing party; (2) the ability of the opposing party to cure 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, 
and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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the prejudice; (3) the extent of disruption of the proceedings; and (4) bad faith or 
willfulness in failing to comply.  Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Assn., 
559 F.2d 894, 904-05 (3d Cir. 1977), overruled on other grounds by Goodman v. Lukens 
Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1985). 
Applying these factors to the admission of the photographs and of Staller’s 
testimony, we determine that the District Court did not abuse its discretion.  First, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding neither prejudice or surprise to 
Sheehan.  The District Court noted that Sheehan had prior knowledge of the photographs 
and the opportunity to request them.  Moreover, Sheehan previously viewed some 
photographs that were at least similar.  Furthermore, the District Court noted that 
Sheehan had “ample opportunity to take Farley’s deposition during discovery.”  (App. at 
27.)  Regarding Staller’s testimony, D&H offered Staller as a witness in response to 
Sheehan’s supplemental report, which nearly doubled the claimed economic damages. 
Second, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Sheehan 
could cure any prejudice through cross-examination.  Indeed, Farley was questioned 
about the discrepancy between prior witness comments that the pictures were dark and 
the clear pictures subsequently offered as evidence.  Similarly, Sheehan had the 
opportunity to cure any prejudice by deposing Staller, which he chose not to do. 
Third, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the 
photographs and testimony would not disrupt the trial.  The District Court found that the 
photographs “would assist the jury in reaching a determination.”  (Id.)  Likewise, 
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Sheehan had an opportunity to cross-examine Staller, whose testimony was consistent 
with his expert report.  Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding 
neither bad faith nor willful disregard on the part of D&H.  Although D&H previously 
represented that it would not call Staller as a witness at trial, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding that D&H was merely responding to Sheehan’s new 
damages calculation in later seeking to admit his expert report.
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Because the District Court appropriately exercised its discretion to admit this 
evidence, it was likewise justified in reconsidering its prior ruling to exclude it.  A district 
court may alter a prior decision due to the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to 
prevent manifest injustice.  Max’s Seafood Café, 176 F.3d at 677.  “A trial judge has the 
discretion to reconsider an issue and should exercise that discretion whenever it appears 
that a previous ruling, even if unambiguous, might lead to an unjust result.”  Swietlowich 
v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir. 1979). 
We find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision to grant D&H’s 
motion for reconsideration, thereby correcting a perceived mistake and preventing an 
injustice.  The District Court had granted Sheehan’s motions in limine one day after they 
                                                 
2
 The District Court also classified the admission of the photographs as harmless, 
finding that the other evidence was sufficient to lead to the same outcome.  We agree.  
Both parties used the evidence in making their arguments.  Even assuming the evidence 
was admitted in error, the District Court was “well-satisfied that the error did not 
prejudice [Sheehan],” and it was not required to “disprove every reasonable possibility of 
prejudice.”  General Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 329 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  Additionally, Staller’s testimony regarding damages was harmless because 
the jury never reached that question. 
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were filed and before D&H had the opportunity to file a responsive brief.  In granting 
D&H’s motion for reconsideration, the District Court thoughtfully considered both sides’ 
arguments.  Moreover, Sheehan had sufficient opportunity afterwards to cure any 
prejudice.  The District Court properly analyzed the Pennypack factors and ultimately 
concluded that excluding the photographs and testimony would prejudice D&H. 
We next address Sheehan’s contention that the District Court erred by failing to 
delay the trial to cure the prejudice he claims he suffered by the late admission of 
evidence.   Sheehan never requested a continuance.  Additionally, Sheehan cross-
examined Farley and used the photographs to argue his case.  Furthermore, the parties 
agreed on a time to depose Staller, but Sheehan cancelled the deposition.  The District 
Court thoroughly considered the prejudice to both parties and decided to proceed with the 
trial.  Thus, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by failing to sua sponte grant an 
adjournment.  For the same reason, a new trial was not warranted because there were no 
“substantial errors in the admission or rejection of evidence.”  Goodman v. Pa. Turnpike 
Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 676 (3d Cir. 2002). 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
